Transparency, incalculability, Mythologies today by Allen, Graham
Title Transparency, incalculability, Mythologies today
Author(s) Allen, Graham
Publication date 2008
Original citation Allen, G., 2008. Transparency, Incalculability, Mythologies Today.
Nottingham French Studies, 47 (2), pp.71-82.
Type of publication Article (peer-reviewed)
Rights ©The University of Nottingham 2008
Item downloaded
from
http://hdl.handle.net/10468/64
Downloaded on 2017-02-12T05:46:20Z
 
 
 
 
 
Allen, Graham (2008). Transparency, Incalculability, Mythologies 
Today. Nottingham French Studies, Vol. 47 Issue 2, Spring 2008, 
pp.71-82. ISSN: 0029-4586 
 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10468/64   
 
 
 
Deposited on: 25 August 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORA Cork Open Research Archive http://cora.ucc.ie 
Transparency, Incalculability, Mythologies Today 
 
GRAHAM ALLEN 
 
What would it mean to speak of the ‘migration into the Anglophone world’ of Barthes’s 
Mythologies? There are many ways in which one could answer such a question. Does 
‘theory’ still exist, is it now dead? To employ Michael Payne’s and John Schad’s title, 
what does it currently mean to live ‘after theory’ and what is the current status of the 
translation (from a series of European words) that gave us the word ‘theory’?1 Is Barthes 
now immured within that archive once known as belles lettres? or is there a need to 
return to what must be Barthes’s most widely consumed text (Mythologies) within the 
Anglophone world? What has been and will be the fate of semiology? Mythologies is 
indisputably a core influence on the rise of Cultural Studies in the ‘worlds’ to which we 
are referring. Thinking about Mythologies today inevitably leads us to consider the status 
and function of Cultural Studies.  
 Mythologies is perhaps the key text for Cultural Studies, and yet, within this 
context of influence and translation, one cannot but remember Barthes’s closing remarks 
in the ‘Necessity and limits of mythology’ section of ‘Myth Today.’2 There Barthes, 
characteristically, positions himself (‘the mythologist himself’) as an excluded and 
alienated figure. Unable to enjoy the goodness of things (‘wine is objectively good, and 
at the same time, the goodness of wine is a myth: here is the aporia’), he is also shut out 
from the history his critique of today’s mythologies points towards: ‘For him, tomorrow’s 
positivity is entirely hidden by today’s negativity’ (M, p.157; OC, p.718). The outsider 
position Barthes ultimately assigns to the mythologist is important, given the history of 
the assimilation of Cultural Studies into the Anglophone university. It might be 
reasonable to assume that this is something Barthes would have found inevitable and 
deeply regrettable, radically compromising the very analysis of ideological structures 
Mythologies attempted to encourage. I say might because we have to question what 
Barthes is being referred to here. Who do we refer to when we refer to Roland Barthes? 
In a retrospective essay such as this – and the subject of this collection foregrounds the 
issue – we can only legitimately refer to ‘a Barthes,’ ‘a Barthes’ situated at a particular 
stage of what Derrida calls the ‘passage’ and the ‘periods’ of Barthes’s life and writing.3 
Barthes, at least the Barthes of Mythologies, might have agreed with Bill Readings’s 
critique of Antony Easthope’s assessment of the universal applicability of Cultural 
Studies.4 In The University in Ruins, Readings argues: 
there is a direct ratio between the intensity of apocalyptic claims for the institutional potential of 
Cultural Studies and their absence of explanatory power. What allows Cultural Studies to occupy 
the entire field of the humanities without resistance is their very academicization of culture, their 
taking culture as the object of the University’s desire for knowledge, rather than as the object that 
the University produces. Culture ceases to mean anything as such; it is dereferentialized.5 
As part of the institution of the university, so Readings’s argument goes, Cultural Studies 
absorbs the kind of semiological analysis of mythology practised by Barthes (the Barthes 
of Mythologies) into the processes of social reproduction.6 
 We cannot stay with Readings’s critique of Cultural Studies, however. His book, 
itself an example of a form of ‘cultural studies,’ dramatically demonstrates that the very 
nature of the relationship between the university and culture has changed and continues 
to change. This change, contra Readings’s account, has not simply to do with the 
collapse of the nation-state in the face of the epoch of globalism. It has also to do with the 
collapse of the very idea of the ‘relative autonomy’ upon which the idea of the modern 
university was first established in the work of Kant and German Romantic philosophy.7 
Today’s university is part of the general economy of the nation-state, itself part of a 
larger global economy. There is nothing now which separates the university from the 
other public institutions and the wider community save a mythology or set of 
mythologies concerning traditional notions of interiority and privilege. The university is 
now a metonymic part of a general economy (at one and the same time national and 
transnational); autonomy has been replaced by all the apparatus of accountability. In this 
scenario it makes little sense to criticize Cultural Studies for bringing culture inside the 
university as an object of study, since the university (what I would call the ‘transparent 
university’) no longer has anything but porous, more frequently see-through walls. It 
makes no more sense to argue for a return to a Cultural Studies directly inspired by the 
Barthes of Mythologies, however, since, as the Barthes of the early 1970s noted, whilst 
mythology remains as dominant as ever, the method of reading it has radically altered: 
Has anything changed? Not French society …. there is still a great deal of the mythic in our 
society: equally anonymous, slippery, fragmented, garrulous, available both to an ideological 
criticism and to a semiological dismantling. No, what has changed in the last fifteen years is the 
science of reading, under whose scrutiny myth, like an animal captured and observed, nonetheless 
becomes a different object.8 
In ‘La mythologie aujourd’hui,’ Barthes refers to Lacan, but it is clear that deconstruction 
is a significant factor in this change in the science of reading. As Barthes puts it in the 
Preface to the 1970 edition: 
semiological analysis, initiated, at least as far as I am concerned, in the final essay of Mythologies, 
has developed, become more precise, complicated and differentiated: it has become the theoretical 
locus wherein a certain liberation of ‘the significant’, in our country and in the West, may well be 
enacted. (M, p.9) 
Questions of whether Cultural Studies academicizes ‘culture’ or can still contribute to a 
transformation of a culture posited outside of the academy’s walls are far less important 
(redundant even) compared to this question of method. In this paper, by returning to 
Mythologies, I want to suggest that the key to the ‘after life’ of theory and the analysis of 
culture rests on the issue of disciplinarity. Put simply, Cultural Studies (understood as the 
analysis of contemporary ideological and mythological languages, structures and forces) 
is as vital today as it ever was; it cannot be conducted in an effective and relevant way, 
however, if it depends on the promotion of an institutional discipline of Cultural Studies. 
‘Theory,’ if that word involves the production of culture, obviously occurs within and 
across disciplines; it does not occur as result of them, even if they are self-declared 
culture-producing disciplines. ‘Theory,’ I would argue, cannot have one authentic 
(proper) disciplinary home. Paradoxically, Mythologies, a text upon which Cultural 
Studies was partly built, can remind us of this fact when we return to it from our current 
historical position. 
Fifty years on, Mythologies has much to offer us in our necessary attempt to 
analyze and critique the mythologies which currently pervade our social environment. In 
particular, I want to argue, it is necessary to return to Mythologies to examine what it can 
offer us in our analysis of the contemporary rhetoric of transparency, by which I mean the 
unavoidable discourses of accountability, evaluation, quality-control, performance 
indicators, the imperatives of excellence, productivity and above all calculability. All 
these terms have a large mythological function within national and transnational contexts 
today, which means they possess a duality of signification which led the Barthes of 
Mythologies to adopt a technique of neologism: sininess, Basquity, governmentality, 
bouvard-and-pécuchet-ity. As he states: ‘there is no fixity in mythical concepts: they can 
come into being, alter, disintegrate, disappear completely’ (M, p.120; OC, p.691). I take 
it that part of the change in the ‘science of reading’ Barthes figures in the early 1970s is 
that instead of attempting to fix these mythological concepts through a practice of 
neologistic invention, our task today is to take on the painstaking (deconstructive) work 
of following the twists, turns and transformations, the divisions, distinctions and aporias 
they generate. Our task, in fact, is to unfix them, to open the lid on their internal 
contradictions, divisions and aporias. 
 In order for Mythologies to help us today we must return to it with a reading that 
privileges singularity, unrepeatability, the unquantifiable, the inimitable, the incalculable. 
I use these concepts with an eye on ‘The Deaths of Roland Barthes,’ in which Derrida 
explores the relation between the metonymic and the singular, the iterable and the 
unrepeatable, and, to employ the terms he takes from Barthes’s La chambre claire, 
Studium and Punctum. The force of Derrida’s reading, which we need to remember is a 
mourning text, a mourning text on a mourning text, can be at least partly summarized in 
the following extract: 
Remaining as attentive as possible to all the differences, one must be able to speak of a punctum in 
all signs (and repetition or iterability already structures it), in any discourse, whether literary or 
not. As long as we do not hold to some naïve and ‘realist’ referentialism, it is the relation to some 
unique and irreplaceable referent that interests us and animates our most sound and studied 
readings: what took place only once, while dividing itself already, in the sights or in front of the 
lens of the Phaedo or Finnegans Wake, the Discourse on Method or Hegel’s Logic, John’s 
Apocalypse or Mallarmé’s Coup de dés. (Derrida, ‘Deaths,’ p.61) 
To say that myth is the product of the iterable appears indisputable. Demonstrating the 
iterable structures (what structure is not iterable?) behind myth’s production of 
miraculous singularities is, of course, one of the principal features of Mythologies. 
Whether it be the apparently unique genius of child poet Minou Drouet, an exhibition of 
‘shock’ photographs, or the ‘wonderful singularity of the writer’ (M, p.30; OC, p.581), 
Barthes’s essays exist in order to return fake singularities to the repeatable functions that 
generate their mythic status. Mythologies reads singularity and unrepeatability in terms of 
the myth of ‘Nature’ and ‘Essence’ and its version of semiological analysis exists to 
return these phenomena to the political sphere from which they have been falsely 
separated: 
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies 
them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a 
clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact. If I state the fact of 
French imperiality without explaining it, I am very near to finding that it is natural and goes 
without saying: I am reassured. (M, p.143; OC, p.708) 
One would imagine that Mythologies would resolutely resist a reading that privileged 
concepts of singularity, unrepeatability and the incalculable. One would imagine that it 
would read these concepts back into the iterable social and political functions which 
bourgeois culture attempts to utilize and hide. How could semiology speak for singularity 
and the incalculable? Is not the purpose of semiology to return the incalculable to the 
political realm of socio-cultural structures, systems, functions, discourses and iterable 
names? Why would we, save for the sake of the work of mourning, privilege notions of 
singularity, unrepeatability and the incalculable? 
 There are many answers. One can be found in Mythologies and its recurrent 
exposure of petit-bourgeois culture’s obsession with calculation and what Barthes calls 
‘quantification.’9 In this rereading of Mythologies Barthes’s attack on the right-wing 
politician, Pierre Poujade, becomes highly significant. The essays on Poujade are a key 
resource for opening up Barthes’s critique of the petit-bourgeoisie’s emphasis on 
calculability. Returning to Mythologies after fifty years allows us to see how an aspect of 
a politically localized and mixed attack on economic centralization now reads like a 
description of the dominant ideological rhetoric of our time.10 I am not suggesting that 
the Union for the Defence of Shopkeepers and Artisans was anything more than a 
footnote in French history. I am suggesting that the insistence on calculability Barthes 
observes within poujadist rhetoric has become for us something more than a local, 
personality-driven issue. 
Against what Barthes calls ‘l’infini du monde’ (OC, 1, p.614), we are presented, 
in ‘Quelques paroles de M. Poujade,’ with the petit-bourgeoisie’s insistence on 
equivalences: ‘a whole mathematics of the equation reassures the petit bourgeois, makes 
him a world to the measure of his dealings’ (ET, p.51; OC, 1, p.614). What Barthes is 
describing is a petit-bourgeois insistence on an economy of payment and repayment 
which fosters a kind of ‘moral bookkeeping’ (‘comptabilité morale’) (ET, p.52; OC, 1, 
p.614) in which ‘qualitative values’ are replaced by ‘a statics of equivalences (an eye for 
an eye, effect vs. cause, merchandise [marchandise] vs. money, penny for penny, etc.)’ 
(ET, p.52; OC, 1, p.614). Barthes, reading Poujade as a spokesman for this petit-
bourgeois ‘moral bookkeeping,’ argues that he pits the tautological ideology of 
equivalences against ‘the dialectic’ which Poujade himself ‘confuses … with sophistry’ 
(ET, p.52; OC, 1, p.614). This leads Barthes to a sustained account of the manner in 
which petit-bourgeois culture founds its value-system on calculation: 
We defeat the dialectic only by an incessant return to calculation, to the computation of human 
behaviour, to what Monsieur Poujade, in agreement with etymology, calls Reason …. Indeed, the 
dialectic risks opening this world we have so carefully closed over its equalities; insofar as the 
dialectic is a technique of transformation, it contradicts the numerative structure of ownership, it 
escapes the petit-bourgeois limits, and is therefore first anathematized, then declared an illusion: 
once again degrading an old romantic theme (which then was a bourgeois one), Monsieur Poujade 
dispenses with all the techniques of the intelligence, asserting petit-bourgeois ‘reason’ against the 
sophisms and dreams of academics and intellectuals discredited by their mere position outside of a 
computable reality. (‘France is stricken with an over production of men with diplomas, 
polytechnicians, economists, philosophers, and other dreamers who have lost all contact with the 
real world’). 
 We know now what petit-bourgeois reality is: it is not even what is seen, it is what is 
counted …. (ET, p.52; OC, 1, pp.614-5). 
The poujadist world-view presented here and elsewhere in Mythologies is one in which 
not only must everything have an economic exchange-value, but, despite that last 
truncated sentence, must equally, logically, be visible. Visibility and calculability are 
reinforcing forces, since if a thing can be counted (even a thing which is ‘not seen’) then 
it must be ‘visible.’ A thing cannot be valued in this poujadist system unless it can be 
brought to view and in that way made valuable by exchangeability. This visible universe 
of things (equalities, equivalences, materialities) implies, Barthes states, ‘the refusal of 
alterity, the negation of the different, the euphoria of identity, and the exaltation of the 
“kind”’ (ET, p.53; OC, 1, p.615). The implication is clear, poujadism denies that which 
cannot be counted and brought to view (to be counted). The dialectic, in Barthes’s 
account, just as clearly involves, like Poujade’s mythologized intellectuals, something 
that lies ‘outside of computable reality.’ 
 The experience of rereading ‘Quelques paroles de M. Poujade,’ from our current 
socio-cultural position, is to witness the rise of a particular aspect of petit-bourgeois 
ideology that now (in a form it would not be able to recognize or accept) dominates every 
sphere of public, institutional, political and cultural life. Cris Shore’s and Susan Wright’s 
excellent collection of essays, auditing culture, gives readers an extremely clear and 
challenging account of the phenomenon I am referring to. They write: 
What we seem to be witnessing throughout the university sector, as in numerous other domains of 
life, are the curious effects of what anthropologists have termed ‘audit culture’, and in particular, a 
form of ‘coercive accountability’ that can be explicitly linked to the spread of a new form of 
managerialism based on neoliberal techniques of governance. The key features of this new regime 
of governance include, inter alia, a fixation with the measurement, quantification and 
‘benchmarking’ of seemingly all aspects of university life; the invention of a plethora of new 
‘performance indicators’ (not to mention the creation of a whole new vocabulary to enable the 
new auditor-experts to assess and rank ‘quality’ and ‘excellence’) and an explosion of new league 
tables to render commensurable hitherto unimaginable phenomena. Thus, we now have national 
league tables that rank everything from hospital deaths, police responses, academic output and 
benefit fraud, to court occupancy, bench cleaning, cervical cancers and primary school test results. 
All of these areas must now be scrutinized, quantified, statistically ranked and ‘rendered visible’ 
either to the consumer or, as in most cases, to the anonymous gaze of the State and its bureaucratic 
machinery.11 
If something is not countable, in this world of universalized poujadism, then it cannot be 
part of what is called ‘reality.’ Barthes’s analysis of this ideology of the visible and the 
countable begins, in the essay that follows (‘Adamov et le langage’), to offer an 
explanation of what I have been calling transparency: ‘As we have just seen, our 
poujadist good sense consists in establishing a simple equivalence between what is seen 
and what is’ (ET, p.55; OC, 1, p.615). The context of Barthes’s statement is a play that 
lacks symbolism and thus conventional literary meaning (‘Ping-Pong ne symbolise rien 
du tout’ [OC, 1, p.616]) but cannot be left in that state by a culture in which such a 
phenomenon represents a dangerous, non-exchangeable, non-countable singularity. 
Today, one could add many other examples of things that must be brought to view in 
order to be counted, including knowledge (research, bildung, judgement) and teaching (in 
all its myriad forms). Transparency, as I employ it, is a figure which speaks to the ruling 
ideology of our day, in which everything must be calculable. It refers to a myth of total 
visibility (and thus total calculability) which presents itself in terms of a political and 
ethical imperative, namely accountability. If something cannot be calculated it cannot be 
made visible to a public accounting (by and within institutions, individual members of 
those institutions, responsible bodies, government agencies, costumers, and ultimately the 
wider public or mediarized ‘nation’). Transparency literally sees through whatever cannot 
be counted and accounted, whether that be the fact that teaching occurs between specific 
individual human subjects in specific (historical) moments in time and in specific spaces, 
or the differences between academic books or even what Derek Attridge, discussing these 
matters, calls the singularity of literature.12 
 Transparency attempts to see through academic judgement in the university, just 
as it tries to see through the situated human judgement of doctors and nurses, policemen 
and policewomen in specific moments of response, or the social worker confronted with a 
crisis requiring immediate action. All arms of the public sphere are now under the sign of 
a transparent force which requires that acts of judgement not only be brought to view for 
accounting but must in fact by calculated before the fact. The culture of transparency, in 
instituting a general law of calculability, seeks to eradicate the possibility of the event, 
even at its most trivial, or pathetic, non-apocalyptic levels. 
 I am suggesting, then, not only that Mythologies presents a sustained critique of 
our current ideological environment, but that it does so in ways which, even against the 
grain of the semiological approach employed within it, suggests the necessity for a 
‘science of reading’ which would articulate a defence of singularity and incalculability. It 
is important, for instance, that Barthes stresses the rationalism of the petit-bourgeois 
insistence on calculation. In ‘L’usager de la grève’ (‘The Man in the Street on Strike’), he 
writes: 
Contrary to what we might suppose about petit-bourgeois dreams, this class has a tyrannical, 
infinitely sensitive notion of causality: the basis of its morality is not magical at all, but rational. 
Only, it is a linear, narrow rationality based on effects. (ET, p.100; OC, 1, p.645). 
The current ideology of transparency and calculability is not an irrationalism, but a mode 
of reason (reduced to the level of accounting, of drawing equivalences, equalities, and 
analogies) that calls irrational and unreal anything that refuses (within itself, as part of its 
essential performance or being) to come to view. It is precisely that quantified, 
quantifying mode of reason that Barthes attributes to poujadism in ‘Poujade et les 
intellectuals.’ Poujadism is at once rational (uses a kind of reason and rationalism) and 
yet is highly suspicious of the rational sciences, because reason contains within itself a 
potential for excess or, in other words, for a movement beyond that of accountability. 
Barthes writes: 
Science and knowledge, for Poujade, are curiously capable of excess. Since every human 
phenomenon, even every mental one, exists only in terms of quantity, it suffices to compare its 
volume to the capacity of the average Poujadist in order to declare it excessive: it is probable that 
the excesses of science are precisely where Poujade finds it to be useless. But this quantification is 
precious to Poujadist rhetoric, since it engenders monsters, i.e., those polytechnicians who support 
a pure, abstract science which applies to reality only in a punitive form. (ET, p.129; OC, 1, p.676) 
Barthes’s analysis of Poujade’s anti-intellectualism centres, then, on the manner in which 
the scientific and intellectual disciplines exceed the legitimate boundary of what is useful 
and quantifiable. They must be brought back into the fold and under control. The 
poujadist response to the threat of excess (which I am reading in terms of a resistance to 
visibility, and thus to incalculability) can only be, once again, prophetic for us of the 
climate of transparency and accountability within which we find ourselves. Poujadism, 
like today’s culture of transparency and accountability, transforms excess into a lack of 
productivity, which can then be mastered through Research Assessment Exercises, 
national Quality Control programmes, and an exponentially accelerating environment of 
tests, surveys, evaluations and performance indicators: 
Here appears a theme dear to all strong regimes: the identification of intellectuality with idleness; 
the intellectual is by definition lazy, he will have to be put to work once and for all, it will be 
necessary to convert an activity which can be measured only by its harmful excess into a concrete 
labor, i.e., accessible to Poujadist measurement. We find that ultimately there can be no labor 
more quantified – and hence more beneficial – than to dig holes or to pile stones: that is labor in 
the pure state, and moreover it is the labor which all post-Poujadist regimes logically end by 
reserving for the idle intellectual. (ET, p.130; OC, 1, p.677) 
As Barthes adds: for poujadist ideology, ‘the head is a suspect site insofar as its products 
are qualitative, not quantitative’ (ET, p.130; OC, 1, p.677). 
 It is at this point of this brief experiment in rereading Mythologies that the 
emphasis I have placed on singularity and incalculability, the same emphasis that in a 
different context Derrida makes when reading Barthes, becomes clear. The central mode 
of resistance to what I have been calling the culture of transparency must be a complex, 
rigorous and uncompromising articulation of the necessity of what does not and cannot 
come to view.13 In today’s transparent universities, for example, when we are instructed 
to operate calculable methods for teaching and research our (dialectical) responsibility is 
towards all those aspects of teaching and research which are either consigned to the realm 
of the invisible and the unsayable, or are by their very nature invisible and resistant to 
articulation. Books cannot be counted as if they were commodities, so we must find ways 
of articulating and defending their singularity and incalculability, even within the 
contexts of such insistent forces as the Research Assessment Exercise. Teaching depends 
on a host of incalculable phenomena, such as desire, transference, emulation, ethnic and 
regional difference, class and ‘culture’, the relationship between private histories and 
public modes of discourse, the uncertain, telepathic ways in which knowledge and culture 
are conveyed and received. Our responsibility, once again, is to explore and defend the 
fundamental aspects of teaching (where teaching involves knowledge, rather than simply 
information), even in the context of the bureaucratization of ‘delivery’ and ‘outcomes.’ 
As Barthes states of authentic literature (rather than bourgeois Literature): ‘Literature, 
however, only begins in front of the unnamable, facing the perception of an elsewhere 
alien to the very language which seeks it out’ (‘La Littérature ne commence pourtant que 
devant l’innommable, face à la perception d’un ailleurs étranger au langage meme qui le 
cherche’) (ET, p.118; OC, 1, p.661). The semiological method practised in Mythologies 
will not help us in such an articulation, but it can significantly remind us of its necessity 
today. The Cultural Studies partly inspired by Barthes’s book must move beyond the field 
of the visible, the audible, and the iterable. I am, of course, referring to Cultural Studies 
as a discipline, in fact the ‘idea’ of a discipline, which would continue and develop the 
socio-culturally transformative work of ‘theory.’ As a discipline, Cultural Studies 
inevitably strives to fix (define, position, distinguish, map, name) its object(s) of study. It 
has to do this as a discipline in order to define its own intellectual and institutional 
disciplinary identity. I have just broken off writing and gone to the bookshelf for an 
example of the Cultural Studies I am attempting to describe. A certain randomness, a 
certain openness to chance, is also important in the resistance to transparency I am 
suggesting here. The apparent randomness, or at least the visible contingency, of the 
selection of subjects is, of course, one of the lasting pleasures of Mythologies and of 
Barthes’s oeuvre generally. The book my eyes alighted on was John Storey’s An 
Introduction to Cultural Theory and Popular Culture.14 The first chapter of the book is 
indicatively titled ‘What is Popular Culture?’ Storey finishes his preamble with the 
following: ‘The main argument which I suspect students will take from this book is that 
popular culture is in effect an empty conceptual category, one that can be filled in a wide 
variety of often conflicting ways depending on the context of use.’15 There appears to be 
no doubt that in one way or another this empty signifier will be and must be ‘filled’ 
(Determined, named, fixed). For Cultural Studies to perform the task of critique and 
transformation so necessary today, it needs to spread itself across the university and 
beyond (where is the border?), and promote the difficult work of exploring and speaking 
for those things which do not come to view and do not count (cannot be counted). Rather 
than a discipline with a disciplinary method or methods, Cultural Studies today must be 
and act like a ‘foreign body’ within (and beyond) the institutional arena of disciplines.16 
The culture of transparency depends on a vast array of unnameable and invisible 
processes, but it is not the case that what I am naming invisible and incalculable are 
exempt, somehow (magically) outside of the economic order. These unnameable 
processes may in fact be what make the economic and the symbolic realms possible. But 
they are also what potentially disturb them and question the legitimacy they gift 
themselves. Two examples. The vision of a European Higher Education Area made law 
by the Bologna Treaty presents us with a trans-national field which is utterly transparent 
(students’ ECTs can be read without need for translation and without interference or 
distortion) and yet which, in the Treaty’s Eurocentric rhetoric, magically retains each 
participating country’s educational and institutional traditions (or idiosycracies).17 In a 
similar way, the now universal demand for Learning Outcomes for all university modules 
implies that student learning (and what do we mean by that?) can be calculated and 
guaranteed long before the teacher (and one presumes they have something more than 
information to impart, something like a culture, bildung) meets the specific, individual, 
and ‘singular’ students who will this year constitute the class. Such institutional 
discourses (of learning and accountability) force the essential singularity and 
incalculability (one cannot do without them, even if one tries) into the realms of the 
invisible and the unsayable. Such demands, such ideological forces would, if they could, 
and they always speak the language of the victor, make student and teacher transparent 
bodies; bodies which can be calculated, seen through, and ultimately guaranteed; bodies 
that are accountable, because on the level of language (the official language of 
transparency) they possess no resistant substance. The dialectic, however, remains, as 
Barthes knew and continued to state, and it makes itself felt, first and foremost, on the 
level of language’s (the sign’s) opacity, its resistance to instrumentalist transparency, the 
current dream of total calculation. 
It may seem that all I have done here is to read Mythologies in terms of Barthes’s 
later, ‘post-structuralist’ work. In fact, by keeping that work in reserve, by remaining 
silent on it and keeping it (for the time of this essay) silent, I have attempted to 
demonstrate how Mythologies can still speak to us today, how it demands a rereading and 
rethinking which is properly historical rather than simply archival. The historical 
rereading of Mythologies is dialectical only if it provides us with a text that we did not 
(because we could not) see before, and which in its own terms (apparently now defunct) 
reflects back to us aspects of our current socio-political climate we struggle (in our own 
terms) to analyze and resist. But such an historical rereading is not guaranteed, it can only 
be wagered. When the forces to be resisted are those of transparency and calculability, 
there can be no disciplinary critique, only a wager on the incalculable and the (for now) 
unrepresentable. What stands between us and Mythologies is the (later) Barthes who 
articulated this need for a non-disciplinary wager, which he positioned firmly within what 
he called ‘literature.’ So I conclude with Barthes’s inaugural address to the Collège de 
France, three years before his death, and I finish the citation at the point where death, 
which, as Derrida notes, Barthes associated with the name, with the tendency in language 
to impose names, to fix names and fix things through names, is, if not defeated, then at 
least, if only for a time, resisted: 
semiology is not a grid; it does not permit a direct apprehension of the real through the imposition 
of a general transparency which would render it intelligible. It seeks instead to elicit the real, in 
places and by moments, and it says that these efforts to elicit the real are possible without a grid. It 
is in fact precisely when semiology comes to be a grid that it elicits nothing at all. We can 
therefore say that semiology has no substitutive role with regard to any discipline. It is my hope 
that semiology will replace no other inquiry here, but will, on the contrary, help all the rest, that its 
chair will be a kind of wheelchair, the wild card of contemporary knowledge, as the sign itself is 
the wild card of all discourse.  
 This negative semiology is an active semiology: it functions outside death.18 
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